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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This habeas corpus case comes to us for the second time 
after having been remanded to the district court to allow the 
state prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenge of a black 
venirewoman in the petitioner's murder trial.  The district court 
found the explanation unsatisfactory and ordered the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania to retry Melvin Johnson within 90 days or release 
him from custody.  The Commonwealth appealed, and we stayed the 
effectiveness of the district court's order pending appeal.  We 
will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
 I.  FACTS 
 Melvin Johnson is black.  He was convicted of second 
degree murder, robbery, burglary, theft, aggravated assault, and 
criminal conspiracy by a jury in the Court of Common Pleas for 
York County, Pennsylvania.  The victims of these crimes were an 
elderly white man and his sister, both of whom were beaten by 
their assailants.  The male victim was known to have solicited 
sexual favors from young black boys over a period of time prior 
to his death.   
  
 The venire for the jury consisted of fifty-two people, 
only three of whom were black.  After five white women and one 
white man had been seated as jurors, the first black member of 
the venire, Joyce Orr, was called for voir dire questioning.  She 
gave ambiguous responses to the questions of the prosecutor, Mr. 
Rebert, concerning the death penalty.  The trial judge sought to 
clarify her views on that subject, and the prosecutor, without 
waiting for clarification, exercised a peremptory challenge to 
exclude her.1 
                     
1
.  The following colloquy took place: 
 
  Do you have any strong feelings against 
the death penalty that would prevent you from 
serving on a Jury in this case? 
 
 A.  No. 
 
 Q.  Do you think the death penalty is 
justified in certain circumstances? 
 
 A.  No. 
 
 Q.  You don't think it is justified? 
 
 A.  No. 
 
  *  *  * 
 
  MR. REBERT:  I would request a challenge 
for cause on that basis, Your Honor. 
 
  THE COURT:  We will ask a few questions 
of the witness. 
 
  Although you do not feel it is justified 
-- 
 
  MR. REBERT:  Excuse me.  I will exercise 
a preemptory [sic] challenge, Your Honor. 
  
 Before another juror had been seated, Vanessa Ferguson, 
another black member of the venire, was called.  After 
ascertaining that she did not know the defendant or his counsel; 
that she did not oppose capital punishment; that she had "no 
strong feelings one way or the other about homosexuality"; and 
that neither she, a relative, nor a friend had been either a 
police officer or a victim of a crime, Mr. Rebert exercised a 
peremptory challenge to exclude her.  The defense objected and 
the following exchange occurred: 
  MR. HARRIS:  Your Honor, we oppose the 
Commonwealth's exercising this particular 
challenge.  We believe he has exercised it 
because this particular Juror is black, the  
same race of the Defendant. 
 
  In the Commonwealth's question of the 
Juror about the death penalty, I think she 
indicated if the evidence showed that, she 
could vote that way.  Of course, I don't 
think the Commonwealth has any real reason 
other than race in this particular case to 
exercise said challenge.  So we oppose it. 
 
  MR. REBERT:  Your Honor, preemptory 
[sic] challenges are sometimes arbitrary and 
even capricious by definition.  I have a 
basis for challenging this Juror.  There is 
no challenge for cause. I have a right to a 
preemptory [sic] challenge and I'm going to 
exercise it.  If I have to state all my 
reasons on the record, I would be happy to.   
 
  THE COURT:  The Courts have already 
ruled -- the appellate Courts have already 
(..continued) 
 
  THE COURT:  Fine. . . . 
 
A. 25-26 (Appeal No. 92-7139). 
  
ruled that preemptory [sic] challenges are 
preemptory [sic] challenges; and as far as 
the Court is concerned, the preemptory [sic] 
challenge is just that.  . . .  We will not 
question either side's preemptory [sic] 
challenges. 
 
A. 37-38 (Appeal No. 92-7139).  
 
 The remaining black member of the venire, Lucius 
Breland, was not called until a jury had been seated and the 
court was attempting to find alternates.  He testified 
unambiguously that he could not impose the death penalty even if 
he believed it to be called for under the judge's instructions.  
The prosecutor challenged for cause and Mr. Breland was excused 
by the court.    
 The defense renewed its Batson challenge in a post 
trial motion, but to no avail.  Having exhausted his state 
appeals, the defendant began a habeas corpus proceeding in the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania based on 
28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The district court accepted the trial court's 
post trial conclusion that the defendant had failed to make a 
prima facie showing under Batson and denied the writ of habeas 
corpus.  The defendant appealed to this court.   
 After recounting the facts and the history of the 
proceedings, this court held that the district court had erred in 
finding itself bound by the state court's conclusion that no 
prima facie case of discrimination had been presented under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  It then noted 
information supplied by counsel at oral argument: 
  
  At oral argument before this court, both 
counsel indicated that the prosecutor is 
still available and could appear at a habeas 
corpus hearing in the district court.  In 
response to a question from a member of the 
panel, counsel for the appellee stated:  
"Yes, the district attorney is available and 
as a practical matter that would be the most 
expeditious thing to do in these cases." 
 
Johnson v. Love, No. 92-7139, Mem. Op., filed June 18, 1993, at 
App. 100.  Based on this understanding, the court did not 
undertake an analysis of whether the record revealed a prima 
facie case of discrimination: 
 [W]e see no need to insist on a wooden 
adherence to a procedural process intended 
for the benefit of the state when a 
prosecutor chooses to proceed expeditiously 
and put a defendant's challenge to rest.  In 
distinguishing a previous decision by this 
Court, the appellee's brief in the case at 
hand reads:  "Here the District Attorney 
offered to place his reasons for the use of a 
peremptory challenge on the record at the 
time of the strike."  Had that offer been 
accepted, it seems likely the issue presently 
before us would have long since been 
resolved. 
 
  We think that, in these circumstances, 
continuing uncertainty in this case can be 
resolved by a hearing in the district court 
at which time the prosecutor's offer can be 
accepted, albeit belatedly, without the 
necessity of inquiring into whether a prima 
facie case was established.  After the 
prosecutor states his reasons for the 
peremptory strike, the district court may 
evaluate his explanation in light of Batson 
and its progeny. 
 
App. 101-02.  
 
  
 On remand, Mr. Rebert was called to testify at an 
evidentiary hearing.  He disclaimed any recollection of his 
reason or reasons for challenging specific jurors.  He did offer 
the following comments on the voir dire process in this case: 
 A.  . . . In this particular case . . . I was 
concerned about the victim and how potential 
jurors might feel about the victim, he was 
not a stellar type individual, and I had some 
concerns about the type of people who were 
going to sit in judgment on that case when 
this victim was involved in the kind of 
activity he was involved in. 
 
  Obviously, you, know, it was a pretty 
brutal crime, and I didn't think that the 
jurors would have much sympathy for the 
alleged perpetrators, but I was very much 
concerned that the victim maybe [sic] more of 
a factor than he should be in this crime. 
 
 Q.  Given the victim's activity, whether 
there was any particular trait of a juror 
that you would deem antagonistic to the 
Commonwealth's goal of seeking a death 
penalty? 
 
 A.  I don't know that I can say that for 
certain.  I think I may have been a little 
bit reluctant, for lack of a better word, as 
far as the women were concerned because this 
was a very distasteful scenario.  Any 
homicide obviously is distasteful, but I 
thought the facts of this case would cause 
one to be a little bit more sensitive than 
another to not react well to the Commonwealth 
and to the victim.  That's a pretty generic 
statement, but that's about all as I recall 
about this selection process. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
 Q.  Let's move to Vanessa Ferguson.  The 
record shows that she was Commonwealth Strike 
No. 6, and she was black.  Why did you strike 
her from the panel? 
  
 
 A.  I do not specifically recall.  I can say 
that I indicated on the record that I did 
have my reasons.  I can say in all candor to 
the Court that those reasons were not race 
related in the sense that I was striking her 
simply because she was black.  However, I 
cannot say that I specifically recall what 
those reasons were.  As I said earlier, the 
victim of a crime was not an individual who I 
felt would get a lot of sympathy from people, 
certainly not a lot of sympathy from a young 
black girl; however, I cannot specifically 
recall the reason for my challenge. 
 
App. 28-29, 30-31. 
 On cross examination, Mr. Rebert confirmed his lack of 
specific recollection: 
 Q.  Well, in any event, the reasons that you 
were prepared to state to Judge Erb back in 
October of 1986 you cannot specifically 
recall those reasons right here today? 
 
 A.  No, sir, I can't. 
 
 Q.  And the notes that you might have made 
concerning what the strikes are are not in 
the file? 
 
 A.  No, sir. 
App. 33. 
 Mr. Rebert's testimony concluded with the following 
exchange: 
  THE COURT:  Mr. Scullion, do you have 
any other examination of this witness? 
  
  MR SCULLION:  No, Your Honor.  The rest 
will be left to argument. 
  
 
  THE COURT:  Thank you very much, Mr. 
Rebert. 
 
  THE WITNESS:  If I may point something 
else out, Your Honor.  The other thing that 
perhaps has not been noted for the record, 
counsel for the Defendant was also black and 
that was another factor that I had to take 
into consideration when selecting a jury.  I 
certainly would not strike a black juror 
simply because the juror was black or because 
of the overall facts of this case and the 
fact that the subject was black and the 
attorney was black, that would not have been 
my reason for the strike. 
App. 37-38. 
 The district court found that Mr. Rebert had no 
specific recollection as to his reason for excluding Ms. 
Ferguson.  It noted that Rebert purported to recall "an overall 
strategy of eliminating women from the jury panel 'due to the 
brutal nature of the crime and the non-sympathetic background of 
the victim.'"  App. 93.  The district court concluded, however, 
that this did not satisfy Batson's requirement of "a 'clear and 
reasonably specific' explanation of [the prosecutor's] 
'legitimate reasons' for exercising" his peremptory challenge.  
476 U.S. at 98 n.20.  The district court further concluded that, 
in light of the fact that the first five jurors seated, as well 
as one alternate, were women, this "proffered reason miserably 
fails to square with the actual events that transpired during 
voir dire."  App. 93.  Because the district court viewed the 
Commonwealth as having a burden under Batson of coming forward 
  
with a non-discriminatory explanation of its challenge of Ms. 
Ferguson and because it rejected as pretext Mr. Rebert's 
speculation regarding his reason for that challenge, the district 
court ordered the release of the petitioner in the event he was 
not promptly retried. 
 
 II.  BATSON STEP ONE:  Prima Facie Case 
 We begin with the holding of Batson and the teachings 
of Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), concerning the 
procedure to be followed when the holding of Batson is invoked 
during voir dire.  Batson held that the prosecution violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
exercises a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory 
way.  When a peremptory challenge is objected to on Batson 
grounds, a three step process ensues: 
 First, the defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that the prosecutor has exercised 
peremptory challenges on the basis of race 
 . . . .  Second, if the requisite showing has 
been made, the burden shifts to the 
prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral 
explanation for striking the jurors in 
question. . . .  Finally, the trial court 
must determine whether the defendant has 
carried his burden of proving purposeful 
discrimination. 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59.  There is thus a threshold 
requirement before the court is to call upon the state to explain 
its challenge; the defendant must show that there is "some reason 
to believe that discrimination might be at work."  United States 
  
v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1156 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 927 (1990).   
 The Commonwealth argues before us that it has no duty 
under Batson to come forward with a non-discriminatory 
explanation.  This is true, it maintains, because petitioner 
never presented a prima facie case under Batson.  Petitioner 
counters that the prima facie case issue became moot when the 
prosecutor offered at trial to explain his reason for challenging 
Ms. Ferguson and that, in any event, the record reflects a prima 
facie case.  We agree with the Commonwealth that the prosecutor's 
unaccepted offer at trial did not moot the prima facie case 
issue.  We conclude, however, that the Commonwealth's renewed 
offer before this court and its acceptance rendered the prima 
facie case issue moot.  We further conclude that, even if we were 
not bound under the applicable precedents to assume the existence 
of a prima facie case, the record in this case, taken as a whole, 
reflects one.   
 
 A. 
 As the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Hernandez indicates, the issue of whether the threshold 
requirement of a prima facie showing has been met becomes moot if 
the prosecution voluntarily places its explanation on the record 
and the trial court makes the rulings required at the second and 
third step of a Batson analysis: 
  
 Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral 
explanation for the peremptory challenges and 
the trial court has ruled on the ultimate 
question of intentional discrimination, the 
preliminary issue of whether the defendant 
had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. 
 We applied this mootness rule in United States v. 
Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
920 (1994), where the prosecutor, in response to a question from 
the court before it had ruled on the prima facie case issue, 
explained why he had exercised his peremptory challenge.  We 
there observed: 
  While we continue to stress the 
importance of the first step of Batson, we 
note that any issue regarding the existence 
of a prima facie showing of discrimination 
becomes moot where, as in this case, the 
prosecutor offers an explanation of the 
peremptory challenge before the district 
court has "expressly address[ed] the prima 
facie issue".  In so holding, we follow the 
conclusion of the plurality in Hernandez  
 . . . .  If the government is found at any 
subsequent stage of the case either to have 
tendered an explanation that is not race 
neutral or to have acted with racial animus, 
the conviction must be overturned without 
regard to whether the defendant established a 
prima facie case. 
Id. at 392. 
 We made a similar observation in United States v. 
Clemmons, 892 F.2d at 1156: 
 [O]nce a prosecutor attempts to explain a 
peremptory challenge, we believe the trial 
and reviewing courts should look to the 
entire record to determine if intentional 
  
discrimination is present.  If the 
prosecutor's explanation raises more concern 
than it puts to rest, courts cannot 
effectively close their eyes to that fact by 
simply deciding that the defendant has not 
made out a prima facie case. 
 Petitioner urges that this case is like Hernandez, 
Uwaezhoke, and Clemmons and that the prima facie case issue 
became moot when Mr. Rebert voluntarily offered at trial to 
explain his reasons for challenging Ms. Ferguson.  We believe 
petitioner misreads those cases, however.  There is a substantial 
difference between an explanation that is placed on the record 
and subjected to judicial scrutiny and an offer to explain that 
is rejected.  In each of these three cases, the court was 
addressing a situation in which the prosecutor had explained his 
challenge and the court had made a finding at trial as to whether 
intentional discrimination had played a role.  In such 
situations, a reviewing court must address the second and third 
Batson issues, i.e., whether the prosecutor's articulated reasons 
were race neutral and whether those reasons were a mere pretext 
to hide intentional racial discrimination.  Where, as here, the 
prosecutor offered to explain his reasons, but was prevented by 
the court from doing so, we think the considerations that 
prompted the mootness holding in Hernandez, Uwaezhoke, and 
Clemmons are not implicated.    
 When the prosecutor has tendered an explanation and the 
trial court has ruled on the neutrality and bona fides of that 
explanation, the only circumstance in which the presence or 
  
absence of a prima facie case could become legally relevant is 
where, at the post-trial motion or appellate review stages, there 
is room to debate the correctness of the trial rulings with 
respect to the neutrality of the explanation or the prosecution's 
good faith in representing that it was the true reason for the 
challenge.  In such circumstances, public confidence in the 
criminal process will be jeopardized if the reviewing court is 
permitted to avoid the ultimate issue of whether invidious 
discrimination occurred by relying on the absence of a prima 
facie case. 
 The same concern is not implicated where, as here, the 
prosecution offers to explain its challenge, but the trial court 
forecloses it from doing so and forges ahead with the trial.  In 
such circumstances, we do not believe that public confidence will 
be jeopardized if a reviewing court subsequently determines that 
the record provides no substantial reason to believe that 
discrimination may have occurred.   
 Contrary to the petitioner's suggestion, we do not read 
Hernandez, Uwaezhoke and Clemmons as holding that the prosecution 
always loses the right to rely upon the absence of a prima facie 
case whenever it voluntarily offers to explain, regardless of 
whether it was permitted to do so.  Moreover, we believe such a 
rule would be unfair.  Where the prosecutor is foreclosed by the 
court from putting his explanation on the record, in the absence 
of a prima facie case, there is simply no justification for 
  
putting the burden on the state of coming forward with a 
satisfactory explanation in post-conviction relief proceedings 
that may occur many years after the conviction. 
  
 B. 
 These conclusions regarding the effect of the 
proceedings before the trial court do not end our mootness 
inquiry.  The appellate proceedings in this case were unusual.  
While the Commonwealth's offer to explain its reasons for the 
preemptory challenge of Ms. Ferguson was not accepted by the 
trial court, that offer was renewed before this court and it was 
accepted in our earlier opinion.  On remand, the Commonwealth 
attempted an explanation.  The district court then concluded that 
the Commonwealth's explanation, in the words of the Clemmons 
court, "raise[d] more concern than it put[] to bed."  892 F.2d at 
1156.  At that point, the prima facie case issue clearly became 
moot under Hernandez, Uwaezhoke and Clemmons, and, accordingly, 
this court is no longer free to dispose of this matter on the 
basis of that issue. 
 As we explained in Uwaezhoke and Clemmons, to allow the 
absence of a prima facie case to be case dispositive when the 
record raises serious questions about the prosecutor's 
motivations would defeat one of Batson's principal purposes -- to 
provide assurance to the defendant and the community that 
criminal judgments are not tainted by invidious discrimination.  
  
Where the record as a whole as ultimately developed permits a 
reasonable argument that the judgment is so tainted, the issue of 
taint must be resolved; it cannot be avoided by a finding that 
the defendant failed to present a prima facie case.  Accordingly, 
consistent with the teachings of Hernandez, Uwaezhoke and 
Clemmons, we can only proceed on the assumption that such a 
showing was made.  This means that the petitioner's conviction 
cannot stand in the absence of a race-neutral explanation from 
the Commonwealth for its exclusion from the petit jury of the 
second black venireperson.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.  
 
 C. 
 While we thus believe that our precedents require us to 
assume that petitioner made a prima facie showing of 
discrimination, we would be constrained to reach the same result 
even if we were free to address the prima facie case issue.  At a 
minimum, the rationale of the cases we have discussed would 
require us to consider the entire record, including the hearing 
on remand, in order to determine whether a prima facie case was 
present, i.e., whether there is reason to believe that 
discrimination may have been at work in this case.  When Mr. 
Rebert's remarks at that hearing are added to the other record 
evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, we conclude 
that there is enough evidence to require the Commonwealth to meet 
the explanation burden imposed by Batson. 
  
 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Batson, when making 
a Batson challenge, a member of a racial group that has 
traditionally been the victim of racial discrimination in our 
society is entitled to rely upon that history as well as on "the 
fact . . . that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection 
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate.'"  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. 
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).  In addition, one who objects 
to a challenge on the basis of Batson is entitled to rely on "any 
other relevant circumstances" tending to support an inference of 
discrimination.  Id. at 96.  When Mr. Rebert's challenge of Ms. 
Ferguson is put in context using the record as a whole, we 
believe there is substantial circumstantial evidence tending to 
support such an inference. 
 Mr. Rebert was prosecuting a case in which the 
defendant was black.  It was also a case in which the defendant's 
attorney was black, and we know from Mr. Rebert's testimony 
during the remand hearing that this "was another factor that [he 
felt he] had to take into consideration when selecting a jury."  
App. 38.  The crime involved in this case was one of violence, 
and both victims were white.  The jury would learn that one of 
these victims had solicited sexual favors from young black boys.  
In such circumstances, a prosecutor still burdened with a 
stereotypical view of the world might well believe that a black 
  
juror would be more sympathetic to the defendant and less 
sympathetic to the victims than would a white juror. 
 Six jurors had already been seated when Mr. Rebert was 
first presented with the choice between exercising a peremptory 
challenge and allowing a black person to sit as a juror.  At that 
point, he still had more than six peremptory challenges 
remaining.  It must have been apparent to him that he might well 
have the capability of causing the jury to be without black 
representation. 
 Mr. Rebert's first opportunity to challenge a black 
person came when Ms. Orr was called.  He ascertained that she did 
not know the defendant or his counsel.  He then asked about her 
views on capital punishment and received an answer that the 
court, at least, thought to be ambiguous.  After the court had 
undertaken to seek clarification but before the matter had been 
clarified, Mr. Rebert exercised a peremptory challenge.  While 
the Commonwealth understandably attributes this challenge to Ms. 
Orr's views on capital punishment, Mr. Rebert's failure to allow 
her to explain her views on that subject raises a question as to 
whether that was the basis of his decision.  The trial record 
suggests no reasons for the challenge other than Ms. Orr's race 
and views on capital punishment. 
 The only other time Mr. Rebert was faced with a choice 
between exercising a peremptory challenge and letting a black 
person be seated as a juror, he once again exercised a peremptory 
  
challenge.  The trial record reveals nothing about Ms. Ferguson 
that might cause a prosecutor to be concerned about her 
objectivity.2  When asked at the remand hearing about the 
challenge of Ms. Ferguson, Mr. Rebert could only indicate that he 
would not expect a "young black girl" to have a lot of sympathy 
for a man who solicited sexual favors from young black boys.  He 
did not explain why he believed a young black girl would have 
less sympathy for such a person than a young white girl.   
                     
2
.  During the hearing on remand, Mr. Rebert indicated that he 
had reviewed the trial transcript and he referred the court to 
the following segment of the defense's questioning of Ms. 
Ferguson which, according to Mr. Rebert, gave him "cause for 
concern," App. 32: 
 
 Q.  I'm going to ask you a few questions; 
again, not to embarrass you.  If the evidence 
-- you hear the evidence and the evidence 
showed that Mr. Johnson did not participate 
in the killing, participate in the beating, 
do you feel that you could vote an acquittal 
of not guilty in that case? 
 
 A.  I would have to hear the evidence. 
 
 Q.  Listen to my question.  You heard the 
evidence, you listened to it and the evidence 
showed that he did not participate in the 
killing, he did not beat the man, do you feel 
that you could vote an acquittal of not 
guilty of that particular charge in that 
case? 
 
 A.  Yes, I could. 
 
A. 35 (Appeal No. 92-7139).  While petitioner was not the person 
who administered the beatings to the victims, we do not view Ms. 
Ferguson's answers as raising concern about her objectivity. 
  
 We are thus presented with a case in which a prosecutor 
harboring discriminatory views would not only have the 
opportunity to discriminate but would also have strong motivation 
for doing so.  On both occasions when the prosecutor had the 
choice between excluding or including a black person, he chose 
exclusion.  The record reveals nothing about either prospective 
juror that would clearly cause a prosecutor free of racial 
stereotyping to question his or her objectivity.  
 The circumstantial evidence we have cited does not 
mandate a conclusion that discrimination occurred, but the issue 
before us is whether there is sufficient reason to believe that 
discrimination may have been at work here to require the state to 
come forward with an explanation of its actions.  We conclude 
that there is.  We acknowledge the possibility that, if Mr. 
Rebert's memory of the trial was still intact, the Commonwealth 
might well have provided an innocent explanation.  It is 
unfortunate that this is not the case, but the passage of time 
cannot fairly be laid at petitioner's feet and it would be even 
more unfortunate if petitioner's conviction were allowed to stand 
without the assurance of a bias-free trial that Batson requires. 
 
           III.  BATSON STEP TWO:  Race-Neutral Explanation                   
Turning to the required second step in a Batson 
analysis, we are presented with two issues:  (1) whether the 
Commonwealth's failure to produce a prosecutor with a specific 
  
recollection concerning the reason for the challenge alone 
requires a conclusion that it has failed to meet its second-step 
burden of providing a race-neutral explanation, and (2) if not, 
whether the explanation tendered by the Commonwealth met that 
burden. 
 
 A. 
 During the hearing before the district court, Mr. 
Rebert admitted that his memory had faded and that he could not 
specifically recall the reason for exercising a peremptory 
challenge against Ms. Ferguson.  The district court concluded 
that "[t]he prosecutor's failure to remember his reason for 
excluding Ferguson eliminates the need for the court to evaluate 
his reason under Batson and, more importantly, entitled Johnson 
to a new trial."  App. 90.  This case does not require that we 
rely on this view of the law, and we expressly decline to endorse 
it. 
 In Batson, the Court instructed that at the second step 
"the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral 
explanation for challenging black jurors."  476 U.S. at 97.  In 
Hernandez, the Court described this burden as the burden "to 
articulate a race-neutral explanation."  500 U.S. at 358-59.  
Both of these descriptions came in the context of instructions on 
the state's burden at trial when a Batson objection is made and 
supported by a prima facie case.  In this context, the prosecutor 
  
who has just made the peremptory challenge is present and his or 
her "articulation" of an explanation is, of course, competent 
evidence of the reason or reasons for the challenge. 
 Given the context of the Supreme Court's observations 
and the purpose of the state's burden at this stage, when a court 
is called upon to apply Batson in a post-trial context, as we are 
called upon to do here, we believe it must insist that the state 
not only articulate a race-neutral explanation but also come 
forward with competent evidence of the prosecutor's state of mind 
when making the challenge.3  We are unprepared to hold, however, 
that the state's burden can never be carried without direct 
evidence from the decisionmaking prosecutor regarding his or her 
state of mind. 
 There will undoubtedly be post-conviction relief 
proceedings in which the state, by reason of death, absence, or 
faded memory, will be unable to produce a prosecutor with a 
specific recollection of the reason for a challenge alleged to 
violate Batson.  Courts frequently are required to draw 
inferences from circumstantial evidence regarding a decision-
maker's state of mind, however, and we are unwilling to rule out 
the possibility that the state may be able to satisfy its step 
                     
3
.  The Court in Batson analogized the state's burden to that of 
the employer in an employment discrimination case after the 
plaintiff has tendered a prima facie case.  The employer's burden 
in that context, while frequently described as the burden of 
articulating a legitimate reason for the adverse employment 
action, is a burden of production.  St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993). 
  
two Batson burden by tendering circumstantial evidence.  In some 
post-conviction relief proceedings, it may well be possible to 
reach a reliable conclusion regarding the true reasons for the 
challenge based upon the nature of the case, the transcript of 
the voir dire of the challenged juror and other prospective 
jurors, contemporaneous notes of the attorneys involved, and any 
other available evidence.4  
 While we thus conclude that circumstantial as well as 
direct evidence can be used to carry the state's burden of 
production at the second step in a Batson analysis, Batson does 
require that the state's evidence, direct or circumstantial, be 
                     
4
.  While we have no occasion to comment here on the sufficiency 
of the state's evidence in United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 
481 (8th Cir. 1989), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals there 
held that the state had met its second step burden with 
circumstantial evidence.  The possibility that the state's burden 
may be met in this way was also recognized by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Alvarado, 923 
F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 
    The district court in this case relied on our opinion in 
Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1003 (1990), for its holding that Johnson was automatically 
entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor's failure to 
recall his reason for excluding Ferguson.  Harrison is 
distinguishable, however, because the prosecutor in that case 
offered no explanation for excluding one of the six black 
venirepersons he had struck from the jury, but simply asserted at 
a hearing before a federal magistrate that he could not recall 
his reasons.  It was based on the prosecutor's assertion that he 
did not know the reason he struck a black venireperson that this 
court affirmed the order for a new trial. Id. at 987.  We do not 
read Harrison to suggest that a state cannot be permitted to 
reconstruct the prosecutor's rationale for excluding a juror 
during a later Batson hearing when the prosecutor admits to 
having no recollection of his motivations at the time. 
  
such that, if credited, it will establish that invidious 
discrimination played no role in the prosecutor's challenge.  
Stated conversely, the Batson inquiry ends and the conviction 
must be vacated at the second stage of the analysis if the 
state's explanation is such that, taken at face value, it either 
demonstrates an equal protection violation, Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 
at 392, or would otherwise be inadequate as a matter of law to 
support the conviction.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (neutral 
explanation unrelated to the particular case to be tried or one 
consisting solely of the prosecutor's denial of discrimination 
inadequate as a matter of law).  The state's circumstantial 
evidence in this case failed to meet this requirement.  
  
      B. 
 The explanation tendered by the Commonwealth at the 
remand hearing, even if taken at face value, does not provide 
assurance that race played no role in Mr. Rebert's decision to 
challenge Ms. Ferguson.  During that hearing, Mr. Rebert 
testified that he was trying to strike jurors who might not be 
sympathetic with the petitioner's victim.  He was especially 
concerned with the objectivity of women jurors because of the 
anticipated evidence at trial regarding the solicitation of 
homosexual favors from young black males by the victim.  In 
explaining his reasons for striking Ferguson, Mr. Rebert said 
 As I said earlier, the victim of the crime 
was not an individual who I felt would get a 
  
lot of sympathy from people, certainly not a 
lot of sympathy from a young black girl. 
 
App. 31.   
 On its face, this explanation for the striking is not 
race-neutral.  It is based on the assumption that Ms. Ferguson's 
objectivity would be impaired in part because she was black and 
because the deceased victim of petitioner's crime had victimized 
black children.  We find this assumption indistinguishable in 
principle from an assumption that Ms. Ferguson's objectivity 
would be impaired because the defendant is black, an assumption 
that the Equal Protection Clause clearly forbids.  Batson, 476 
U.S. at 97.  Both assumptions are based on a stereotypical view 
or intuition that black people, because of their race, will 
relate to other black persons in a way that may preclude them 
from basing a verdict solely on the relevant evidence.  In 
somewhat similar circumstances, we have held that the state's 
explanation was not race-neutral.  See Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 
960, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 In addition, Mr. Rebert gave further testimony that 
precludes a finding that the Commonwealth's explanation was race-
neutral.  At the close of the hearing, he volunteered that 
counsel for the defendant was also black and that this was 
another factor that he "had to take into consideration when 
selecting a jury."  App. 38.   Although Mr. Rebert insisted that 
he would not have striken Ms. Ferguson because she was a member 
of the same minority group as the defendant and the defendant's 
  
attorney, on its face, the quoted comment indicates to us that 
race did play a role in Mr. Rebert's decisions regarding 
peremptory challenges.   
 The facially race-based nature of Mr. Rebert's comments 
requires us to conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to meet 
its burden of providing a race-neutral explanation for the 
challenge of Ms. Ferguson.   
 
 IV. 
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed.   
